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SUPREME COURT FEDERALISM DECISIONS
Leon Friedman*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Now, our next speaker is one that we are always proud to have
here.
He is widely regarded as a profound constitutional law authority
and he is a professor at the Hofstra Law School. He was director
of the Committee for Public Justice, Staff Attorney for the Civil
Liberties Communication Communion, and has written extensively
on numerous Supreme Court issues of critical importance.
The federalism cases are probably among the most startling and
interesting ones that came down in the last term and we have asked
Professor Friedman to talk to us about them. Professor Friedman.
ProfessorFriedman:
I. INTRODUCTION
Thank you very much. In this era of baseball statistics I thought
I would give you a few numbers relating to the United States
Supreme Court. Since Marbury v. Madison,' when the Supreme
Court established the principal of judicial review, the Supreme
Court has found one hundred fifty federal laws unconstitutional.
Which is, the last time I looked, a little less than one per term. It

* LL. B. 1960 Harvard, Admitted New York Bar, 1961. Graduate Student,
History, Harvard GSAS, 1954-55; Assoc. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, NY 1960-67; Gen. Counsel, Chelsea House Publishers, 1963-70;
Associate Director NYC Bar Association Special Committee on Courtroom
Conduct, 1970-73; Staff Counsel ACLU 1973-74; Associate Professor Hofstra
1974-80; Professor since 1980.
15 U.S. 137 (1803).
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was not until Dred Scott v. Sanford, in 1857, that the Supreme
Court declared the next federal law unconstitutional.3
The Warren Court was a very activist court. Justice Warren was
chief justice for sixteen years, and in that sixteen-year period they
declared nineteen laws unconstitutional, which is approximately
1.19 laws per year. While, in the last five years the Rehnquist
court, a very conservative court, has declared twenty-one federal
laws unconstitutional, an average of 4.1 federal laws declared
unconstituitional per year.
Just so we have all the numbers correct, over the entire thirteen
years of the Rehnquist court they declared twenty-nine laws
unconstitutional, an average of 2.23 federal laws per year. Now,
who is the activist court? If we think that Congress represents the
people and that the Supreme Court should be very reticent about
exercising its power of judicial review, how can you explain
twenty-one federal laws being struck down in a five-year period?
Now, of those twenty-one laws struck down in this five-year
period, seven of them were on federalism grounds. These did not
concern constitutional rights (i.e. "you violated my constitutional
right"), but rather involved federalism grounds (i.e. "you have
violated the structure of the Constitution" and "you have taken
power away from state governments, not necessarily local
governments"). That is an astounding switch in the way in which
the Supreme Court applied its power of judicial review.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE COURT
There are four areas in which the Supreme Court has in effect
raised the power of federalism. The first of the four is the United
States v. Lopez line of cases.4 Lopez involved a law passed by
Congress, the Gun Free School Zone Act,5 which said that if you
60 U.S. 393, (1857). The Court held that Dred Scott had not become a free
man during his residence at Fort Snelling, Wisconsin despite his claim of
freedom under the Missouri Compromise, because the Missouri Compromise
was unconstitutional from the beginning, as it was in violation of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against deprivation of property without due process of
law.
3 Id.
2

4

1d.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

5 18

U.S.C. § 921(a), 922(q) (1990).
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possess a gun within a thousand feet of a school zone you have
violated a federal law, and it is a five-year felony.6 However, in
1995, the Supreme Court held that the, Act exceeded Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause.' The Supreme Court had not
told Congress that they had gone too far in exercising their power
under the Commerce Clause since 1936.8 If you look before
Lopez, maybe go back through the late New Deal period, it was
sixty years before the Supreme Court told Congress that they did
not have these powers.
As an aside, the Commerce Clause is back before the Supreme
Court this year in a case involving the Violence Against Women
Act.' In a badly split opinion, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
Violence Against Women Act, another law passed by a virtually
unanimous Congress, which made it a federal crime to engage in
an act of violence on the basis of gender.10 The original panel
decision upheld the Act on the basis of the Commerce Clause,
saying that if you kill and murder and rape enough women, they
would not go to work in the morning and won't produce enough
goods and services that move across state lines." However, on
rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit said, it does not substantially
affect commerce and we do not think Congress made sufficient.
findings that rape, murder and assault on women really affects
3
commerce.' The Supreme Court will look at that case this year.'

6 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides in pertinent
part: "The Congress shall have the power... to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id
"United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). This was the last of a series of
cases in which the Supreme Court struck down various "New Deal" legislation.
Following his election in 1936, Roosevelt revealed his Court Packing Plan,
which would have increased the number of Supreme Court Justices to fifteen,
six of whom would be Roosevelt appointees. After the "court-packing" plan
was presented to Congress the Court curtailed their review of economic reform.
Id.
942 U.S.C. § 13981 et. seq. (1999).
10 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
1 132 F.3d
12id.

949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated 169 F.3d 840 (4th Cir. 1999).

13 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
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The second area in which the Supreme Court has raised the issue
of federalism involves the line of Tenth Amendment cases,
beginning with Printz v. United States, 4 which dealt with the
Brady Handgun Violence Act. 5 In the decision by Justice Scalia,
he said that the federal government cannot make state officials
carry out federal policy; they are not youi.-servants, they (i.e.
county attorneys, city attorneys and state attorneys) are not the
instruments of federal policy.' 6 If you want to do something, have
your own federal officials do it. Do not make state officials carry
out a federal policy, 7 even a policy as small making a handgun
check to find out whether a person who is trying to buy a handgun
fell within one of the prohibited categories (i.e. had a criminal
conviction, mental health problem, etc.). 8 Therefore, since the
Brady Act placed an obligation on local chief law enforcement
officers to make background checks, the Supreme Court held, in a
five to four decision, that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the
federal government from forcing state officials to carry out federal
policy."
This year, the Supreme Court has another case involving the
Drivers Privacy Protection Act..2' This is yet another law passed by
a unanimous Congress that says we do not want state officials to
sell motor vehicle information for commercial purposes.2' In the
past, the states' motor vehicle division would sell motor vehicle
information to a commercial outfit who would then make some
money reselling the information.' Unfortunately, a stalker found
out where some actress lived by buying motor vehicle information
14 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also U.S. CONST. amend.

X. The Tenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id
"s 18 U.S.C. § 922 et. seq. (1999).
16 Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
17id.

1 18 U.S.C. § 922.
'9 Printz, 521 U.S. at 936.
20 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1999).
21 Id.
22 Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). "The motor vehicle information
which the States have historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct
marketers... to contact drivers with customized solicitations." Id. at 667.
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available through a commercial outfit, found and killed her.'
Congress thought this was not a good idea, so they passed the
Drivers Privacy Protection Act, which prohibited States from
selling this information for commercial purposes.'
The Fourth Circuit held that the Act was unconstitutional, a
Tenth Amendment, violation because Congress is forcing, the states
However, I am not sure if
to carry out a federal policy.'
information is carrying out a
motor
vehicle
sale
of
preventing the
federal policy, because they are prohibiting the states from doing
something. So that is the Tenth Amendment line of cases.
The third line of cases are the combination of Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendment cases. ' Again of the seven federal laws
that were declared unconstitutional on federalism grounds, four of
them are on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In 1996, the Supreme Court, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,' held that Congress cannot overturn a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity unless two things are done.' Number one,
it must make its intention clear, absolutely clear.' Number two,
there must be some other constitutional basis for overturning the
state's immunity3 o That is to say, Congress can overturn a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity if they are exercising their powers
23 Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, n.4 (1999) (During floor debate on the Senate
version of the Act, Senators invoked the example of Rebecca Shaeffler, an
actress from California, who was murdered by an obsessed fan who obtained her
address from the department of motor vehicles through a private investigator.
See 139 Cong.Rec. § 15, 766, Comments of Senator Harkin. See also (Feb. 4,
1994) (statement of Rep. Moran): 139 Cong.Rec. § 15, 762 (Nov. 16, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Boxer); 139 Cong. Rec. § 15, 765 (Nov. 16, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Robb): 139 Cong.Rec. § 15,765 (statement of Sen. Biden)).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1999).
25 Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281 (1999).
26 See U.S. CONsT. amend XI. Providing in pertinent part: "The judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any situation... against
one of the United States by citizens of another State." Id.; see also, U.S. CONST.
amend XIV § 5. (authorizing Congress to enforce the other provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which insure protection against the deprivation of life,
liberty or property without due process of law).
27 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
29 id.
29
3 0Id.at 56.

Id. at 40.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment. "s The Seminole Indian decision
overturned Pennsylvania Union Gas,32 which held that Congress
could overturn Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, the Court created a much stricter constitutional
rule for ovtmingfEleventhAmendment immunity.33
The final line of cases follows City of Boerne v. Flores,34 in
which the Supreme Court said when Congress exercises its
Fourteenth Amendment power, it must do so to remedy an already
existing constitutional violation.35 In other words, Congress cannot
declare what the Constitution means and afford a remedy for
violations.36
In Boerne, the Supreme Court reviewed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,37 which broadened religious freedom beyond that
which the Supreme Court had defined, and the Act established a
remedy for violations.38 The Supreme Court held that this was
beyond the power of Congress.3 9 The Supreme Court defines what
the constitutional right is, and Congress is then empowered to
provide a proportional remedy.40 Accordingly, Congressional
power under Section 5 is limited to preparing, creating, or
establishing a proportionate remedy to a Constitutional violation
already found by the Supreme Court.4 '
The whole point of the Fourteenth Amendment, by the way, is to
put restrictions on the states. Section 1 says, "No state shall
deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, or deprive any person of ... equal protection of the law."42
Therefore, since the Fourteenth Amendment speaks to the states,

31 Id.
32

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
44 (1996).

3 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
34 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

35 Id. at 518. (prohibiting Congress from creating new Constitutional rights,
but36 allowing Congress to remedy or prevent a Constitutional wrong).
37

ld. at 508.
Id

at 507.

38 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb.
39
Flores,521 U.S. at 520.
40 id.
41

42

id.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Enabling Act,43 is
the vehicle by which Congress passes these laws, what Boerne
really says to Congress is you have to be very careful when you
exercise that power.
All of these three things came together in the very last day of the
term when the Supreme Court, on June 23, 1999, declared three
separate federal laws unconstitutional.' The three cases are Alden
v. Maine,45 FloridaPrepaidv. College Savings Bank 6 and College
Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaid.7 Remember, from the beginning
of time until today, one hundred fifty federal laws have been
declared unconstitutional. Now in one day they declared three
federal laws unconstitutional. Big day!
III. ALDEN V MAINE
Alden dealt with the Fair Labor Standards Act.48 If ever the
Supreme Court has had a flip-flop, their view on this Act is the
biggest flip-flop of all time. The Fair Labor Standards Act, which
applies to all employers across the country (i.e. private employers,
county employers and local government employers), created a
forty hour work week, and says that if employees work overtime,
they must be paid time and a half for overtime, and double time for
weekends. 9 However, the longstanding question facing the Court
was whether this law could be applied to the state governments?
The first case dealing with the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Marylandv. Wirtz,5" was heard in the 1970's. Federal law said that
the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to state schools as well as to

43 U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 5. this section provides that "Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article."
Id
44 The Fair Labor Standards Act, The Patent Remedy Act, and The Trademark

Remedy Act
4.119 S. Ct.2240 (1999).
46 119 S.Ct.2219 (1999).
47 119 S. Ct.2199 (1999).
41 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1938).
49

id.

50 Maryland

v.Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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hospitals." The Supreme Court, in Wirtz, saw no problem with
52
this.
However, when Congress later expanded the Act to all state
employees,53 the Fair Labor Standards Act once again came before
the Supreme Co4,. this tlime -in National League of Cities v.
Usery 4 In Usery the Supreme Court found the new provision,
which made all state government employees subject to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment."
it was a Tenth Amendment case because, the
financial obligation placed on the states and local governments
may be so onerous that the states and local governments may not
be able to perform their functions. 6 In other words, if you have to
pay time and a half to a fire person or police person, the financial
drain could be so severe that the states could not do what they are
supposed to do. Well, the Court's opinion National League of
Cities only lasted nine years, because the Supreme Court once
again went the other way in Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Authority."
So, first in Wirtz, the Court said that Fair Labor Standards Act
can be applied to states.5 Then in National League, it said no, it
cannot be applied to the states.59 However once again, in Garcia,
the Court said it can be applied to the states.6" So now what
happens in Alden v. Maine? The Supreme Court says it cannot be
applied to the states.6 So they have flip-flopped on this issue three
times.
-' 29 U.S.C.A. § 216.
52

Wirtz, 329 U.S. 183.

53 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 as amended by 29
U.S.C. § 203(s)(5).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
55
56

57

Id.

at 842.

id.

469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia,the Supreme Court held that the Transit

Authority was not entitled to Tenth Amendment Immunity from the minimum
wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
5 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197.
59 Usery, 426 U.S. at 842.
60 Garcia,469 U.S. at 557.
61 Alder v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999) holding that the Fair Labor Standards
Act cannot be applied to the states because the federal system established by our
Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the states. Id.
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Alden v. Maine is not a Tenth Amendment decision, it is an
Eleventh Amendment decision.' In Alden, state probation officers
in Maine wanted overtime pay.3 They worked a lot, so they
brought an action in federal court for their overtime relying on the
Fair Labor Standards Act." While the case was pending, the
Seminole Indian case was decided, holding that Congress cannot
overturn Eleventh Amendment immunity unless it is relying on the
Fourteenth Amendment, and can not do it pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.65 As a result, the First Circuit threw out the
case saying that the Fair Labor Standards Act was not passed
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.' In response, the
probation officers bring their action in state court. 7
The Eleventh Amendment says two things, both of which the
Supreme Court has totally disregarded since the beginning. It says
the judicial power of the United States shall not extend to a suit
between a state and a citizen of another state." If you want to be
textualists, that is the text. "The judicial power of the United
States shall not extend to a case between a state and a citizen of
another state."69 Alden brings a suit against Maine, his own state,
in the state court.70
Therefore, on two grounds the Eleventh
Amendment should not be a problem. In numerous cases the
Supreme Court said again and again that the Eleventh Amendment
only prohibits suits against states in federal court, and does not in
any way affect a suit against a state in a state court.7 ' This is a
Supreme Court that looks at the text, after all, we should not read
our own view into the Eleventh Amendment. We have to read the
62

d. at 2247.

at 2246.
64d.
Fair Labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938), which provides for the
standards of labor in the United States.
65 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996).
66id. at 75.
67Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (1998).
68 U.S. CONST. amend XI, which states in pertinent part: "[t]he judicial power
631

of the United States shall not be extended to a case between a state and a citizen
of69another state." Id
70

Id.
1id.

7' See

generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);

Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
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text and here the text of the Eleventh Amendment tells us that on
two grounds it should not be a problem.
The Amendment is read that way because back in 1789 one
could not sue a state in federal court on general federal question
grounds, the only basis for suing a state was diversity jurisdiction.
Diversi y jurisdiction was the only way you could get the case into
federal court, because the general federal question jurisdiction
statute was not passed until 1875.' All cases, except cases where
there w, s diversity, had to be brought -in state court. Then, of
course, if a state was sued in state court, it could apply whatever
sovereign immunity doctrine it might have. So a hundred years ago
73 the Supreme Court says, "Oh, well, it
in Hans v. Louisiana,
doesn't say between a state and its own citizen, but that is what
they meant, I know we have to violate the text of the Constitution,
but that is really what they meant." 74
In the 1970's and 1980's there was an effort to overturn this
ruling by, I have to call them the liberals, Blackman, Stevens,
Marshall and Brennan, who asserted that the restrictive Hans
decision was against the Constitution. It only deals with diversity
cases, it does not deal with federal question cases, so one should be
able to sue a state in federal court if you are relying on general
federal question jurisdiction. Thus, you should be able to sue your
own state in federal court on the basis of some federal statute.
There are a series of cases in which all the Justices were getting
closer and closer to overruling Hans, and going back to the text of
the Eleventh Amendment. However, that never happened. Forget
throwing the Eleventh Amendment out the window, the Eleventh
Amendment had become enormously strong. That whole effort to
read the Eleventh Amendment in accordance with its text did not
happen.
Indeed, Alden itself is an expansion of the Eleventh Amendment
way beyond its actual text. The Supreme Court in Alden said that
See, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides in pertinent part: "[Tihe district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, law, treaties of the United States. Id.
73 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Hans case held that a State
cannot be sued by a citizen of another state or a foreign state. Id.
74 Id. at 11, "[The Eleventh Amendment] did not in its terms prohibit suits by
individuals against the states, but declared that the constitution should not be
construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits." Id.
72

2000

FEDERALISM DECISIONS

whatever immunity a state would have in federal court, it must also
have in its own state courts.75 Therefore, if a state establishes a
sovereign immunity doctrine, it can apply that doctrine in any
federal claim brought in the state courts.76 That is an extraordinary
expansion of the Eleventh Amendment, and to do so the Supreme
Court had to overrule or explain away a whole series of earlier
7
cases.7
Justice Kennedy accomplished this feat by noting that if you
want to read the textbooks, read the text.' How did he get there?
He used history, practice, precedent and structure.' When we
started, states historically had sovereign immunity." The practice
at the time was that states could not be sued in their own courts.8'
Whatever precedents we have, I know we have to explain away
about half a dozen cases, but those all can be explained away.
However, most importantly, the structure of the Constitution
prohibits thisY There is a wonderful phrase in which he talks
about the states, and asserts that the states are not provinces as in
France or a subsidiary of a corporation. 3 Accordingly, the Court
held that they can not make states subject to suit in their own
courts.'
I will now review the manner in which he did this. I mean the
history, practice, precedent and structure. The history was a little
more complicated, and Justice Souter has a much longer dissent."
75 Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2245 (1999). The Court found that
"Congress cannot abrogate States' sovereign immunity in federal court; were the
rule different the National Government would wield greater power in state
courts than in federal courts. Id.
76 id.

77 d at 2258. see also Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission,
502 U.S. 197 (1991); Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989).
78 id
79

1d. at 2246.

So See generally Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779

(1991)(noting that "[t]he states entered the federal system with their sovereignty
intact."
81
Id.

82

Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246.

3Id. at 2250.

84 id

85 1d. at

2269 (J. Souter, dissenting).
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The discussion goes back to the Federalist Papers, back to the
ratification debates.86 As a matter of fact the colonies were not
immune, and Justice Souter goes into this in great detail.8 7 So
when did this long established doctrine of state sovereign
immunity arrive? States were independent states for a very short
period of timae and itwas not al that clear.
Besides, the whole point of the Constitution and the social
contract theory is that we the people are sovereign, not the states.
We give o government very limited powers, and only those
powers that are necessary to function. We give to the states certain
limited powers, and we give to the federal government certain
limited power. So where does the state get its sovereignty? The
people. If we give Congress certain powers, why is not the
congressional exercise of those powers superior to whatever it was
we gave the states? Thus, there is a little theoretical problem about
where the sovereignty comes from.
The big fight in the historical debate was all about Chisholm v.
Georgia.88 In Chisholm, as part of the post revolutionary war,
there was a big fight over land grants.89 The states had seized the
land of the royalists who left the country, and then proceeded to
sell the land. The fight was outlined in the case Hunter v. Martin.9
Pursuant to the Jay Treaty and the Paris Treaty, the federal
government agreed to give the land back to the original
landowners. 9' Naturally, many fights ensued over the title to this
land. Chisholm, a resident of South Carolina, sued the State of
The case went to the
Georgia in a federal court in Georgia.'
Supreme Court, and they held it was okay to sue the state in federal
court.93 Of the four justices who voted in the majority, two of them
were at the Philadelphia Convention, and they should know
whether the Constitution permitted a suit against the state or not.
86 1d.

at 2292.

87ld. at 2271-73.
88 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
89
Id.
9 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
91 The Jay Treaty, 1794,

U.S.-Gr.Brit., 8 Stat. 80.
92 2 Dall. at 426.
93 Id.

U.S.-Gr.Brit., 8 Stat. 116; The Treaty of Paris, 1783,
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Thus, the historical evidence concerning sovereign immunity was
not all that clear.
The very fact that states could be sued in federal court was a
radical departure from the prevailing ethos at the time. The
Eleventh Amendment was passed in response to Chisholm, and
was a very quick answer to that decision. Consequently, the history
and practice is not all that clear.
There is a lot of confusion about how well established sovereign
immunity was even in the state's own courts. As for precedents,
that is not so easy. The Supreme Court had a case that was directly
on point, Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railvay Commission.
In Hilton, a suit was brought in federal court in South Carolina
under the Federal Employees Liability Act."' The issue was
whether an employee of the state railroad could be subject to this
federal statute?'
The Supreme Court said yes, the employee
7
could.
Justice Kennedy said they did not raise the argument.' They did
not know they had this wonderful argument about the Eleventh
Amendment and that is why the case ended up the other way.'
There were a couple of other problem cases. In Hall v. State of
Nevada,"° the State of Nevada was sued in California State
Court.l° The question was whether Eleventh Amendment
immunity applied where the state of Nevada was sued in a
California State Court. 0 The answer was no, the state of Nevada
did not have immunity. Well, that is another precedent you have
to forget about. The whole idea, and a major part of the Alden
94 502 U.s. 197 (1991).

95 45 U.S.C. § 51, this section provides in pertinent part that "[E]very common
carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several

States or Territories ...
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or in case of the death
of such employee to his or her personal representatives." Id.
96 Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199.
97 Id at 204-05.
9'Id at 200.
99Id.at 205.
'o0 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
101 Id.
' 021 d at 411.
'

03

Id. at 414.
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decision, is trying to explain away a whole bunch of precedents
that would seem to say that states do not have all that sovereignty.
Another problem for the Court, lurking in the Alden case, is an
argument that was made below, that you can not make a state court
-hear a -fedemal. claim. This is ,a Tenth-.Amendrment. argument
because it comes out of the Printz case."° If you cannot make a
state sheriff do a background check to enforce the Brady Bill, how
can you make a state judge hear a federal claim? That is a Tenth
Amendment problem. If Congress wants to carry out a federal
policy, then have federal courts do it. Why should a state court
hear a Section 1983 case or a Title VII case, a RICO case, or any
other federal case? We have been doing this for a couple hundred
of years. Indeed at the very beginning the state courts were the
only courts that could hear federal claims since there was no
federal question jurisdiction.
One of the arguments that was made here was to forget suing in
state court. 5 State courts should not be the vehicle for hearing
federal claims. If you have a federal claim go to federal court, do
not burden the state courts. Do not clog our courts with your
federal claims.' 6 Moreover, there was an earlier precedent,
Howlett v. Rose,"°7 which relied upon the Supremacy Clause, and
held that Congress can require state courts to hear federal claims."0 8
Again, this is not a claim against just the state, but any federal
claim.
In Alden, the majority said that they were not going to overrule
that precedent.0 9 As far as we are concerned, state courts are
obligated to hear federal claims against everyone else (i.e.
counties, cities, local governments, private people), but not against
the state, if the state has a sovereign immunity doctrine that would
apply."0 Thus, whatever sovereign immunity doctrine it has with
respect to its own causes of action it can apply to any federal cause

104
105

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 924.

106
107

id.

496 U.S. 356 (1990).
'o"
Id.at 367-68.

'09Alden, 119 U.S. at 2245.

l

Id.
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of action. Why? Because of the structure of the Constitution, not
the text of the Constitution."'
There is nothing in the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment
or any other part of the Constitution that requires the result. It is
the structure of the Constitution. The whole point of our system is
that power is divided. We have state governments and local
governments. We have the separation of powers, and the more
power that is divided and diffused, the better. Accordingly, if the
states have to be sued in their own state courts on a federal claim,
that will somehow upset the structure of the Constitution."'
I am on the Federal Legislation Committee of the City Bar
Association, and we just issued a report,"' that is soon to be
published in the City Bar Association record, in which we say the
reason why the states had the separate power back in 1789 was
because they had just established the federal government and gave
the federal government the power to have a standing army."" The
big fear back in 1789 was that the federal government, with its
standing army, would somehow march on the states and take away
their power. However, that problem does not seem to be a big one
today. It does not seem to have been a big problem for one
hundred eighty years. Therefore, there has to be a better reason for
saying we want the states to have this separate identity.
The second part of our report asserts that the states have plenty
of political power (i.e. the electoral college, two senators for each
state, the fact that the qualifications for voters are set by the states),
and they do not need any assistance from the Supreme Court. It is
not as if we allow states to be sued in federal court on a federal
claim, that this will somehow take away from the political power
the states have. It struck us as a little bit unrealistic. There has to
be a reason for this. If you are not looking to the text of the
Constitution, and there is nothing in the text that supports this
111
Id.

112Id

See appendix I, The New Federalism: A Report of the Committee on
Federal Legislation of the Bar of the City of New York, 54 The Record 712
(1999).
114 U.S. CoNsT. amend. II, allowing the state to establish a well regulated
Militia and the right to bear arms. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed. Id
113
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result, you really have to have a better reason for coming to this
result, so our committee said.
Nevertheless, it was a five to four decision and that is just the
first one." 5 The bottom line is that the Fair Labor Standards Act
cannot -be .applied 'to a state- employee, but. may be applied to
private and local employees."' 6 However, there are four and a half
million people working for the states, it is about two to three
percent of the entire work force, and they are not subject to the
protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Two days ago, the Supreme Court heard arguments as to
whether state employees are subject to the Age Discrimination
Law." 7 Therefore, it is likely we may get the same five to four
decision with respect to the Age Discrimination Law." ' We still
have the Family Leave Act," 9 the American with Disabilities
Act, 2 ' and half a dozen other federal laws designed to protect
employees in the United States. The only employer within the
United States that will not be subject to these protective measures
is state government. That is a peculiar result, but that apparently is
the way in which the court is moving.
IV. COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK & FLORIDA PREPAID
The two other cases are not quite as visible as the implications of
the Alden case.' 2 ' In 1992, Congress passed three laws; the Patent
Remedy Act, 22 the Trademark Remedy Act'23 and the Copyright
Remedy Act. 124 All three of these laws made the states amenable
to suits for trademark infringement, copyright infringement and
patent infringement in federal court. These laws were passed
pursuant to Pennsylvania v. -Union Gas."' Congress established
Alden 119 U.S. at 2445.
Id. at 2246.
1729 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (1999).
11 29 U.S.C. § 633 et. seq. (1999).
19 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et. seq. (1999).
120 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et. seq. (1999).
121 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
11

116

'22
'23
124

35 U.S.C. § 281 et. seq. (1999).
15 U.S.C. § 1051 et. seq. (1999).
17 U.S.C. § 501 et. seq. (1999).

" 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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that there really is a problem about state universities, subject to
Eleventh Amendment copying people's writings, stealing their
inventions, or engaging in commercial activity generally."z
Furthermore, there is no reason why the states, when engaging in
proprietary commercial activities, should not be subject to the
same laws as anyone else.
In College Savings Bank v Florida,suit was brought in a district
court in New Jersey because the State of Florida had established
some sort of student loan system that copied a student loan
program established by a bank in New Jersey.'27 The College
Saving Bank, which had a patent on a particular procedure for
arranging student loans, sued the Florida Prepaid Secondary
Education Expense Board, which was an agency of the State of
Florida, for trademark infringement and patent infringement.,.
Patent cases get appealed through the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. The appeal on the patent claim went to the Federal
Circuit. Since all other cases are appealed to the circuit court in
which the district court sits, the appeal on the trademark claim
went to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit found that the
Trademark Remedy Act was unconstitutional, because it violated
the Eleventh Amendment. 29 However, the Federal Circuit found
that the Patent Remedy Act was a proper exercise of Congress'
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Subsequently, both
3
cases went to the Supreme Court.' '
In deciding these cases, the Supreme Court utilized the two-part
test for Eleventh Amendment immunity 3 2 First, did Congress
make its intention clear? Give me a break. The law clearly
mandates that the states shall be amenable to suits in federal court
for trademark infringement and patent infringement.' There was
nothing else in the law. The whole purpose of the law was to make
126See supra notes 128-130.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board., 948 F. Supp. 400 (D. N.J. 1996).
'8Id
at 402.
127

'2 9 College Savings Bank, 131 F.3d at 366.
130 College Savings Bank, 148 F.3d at 1355.
131

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College

Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
132 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
133 ida
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the states amenable. That one was easy, and no one had any doubt
that Congress made its intention clear.
However, one of the reports I saw about Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents 34 the other day indicates that Justice O'Connor said: "Did
Congress %5ntion, the ,Eleventh. Amendment when it made the
states amenable?"'35 You've got to mention the Eleventh
Amendment? The Age Discrimination Act has a very tortured
history because Congress simply adopted the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and did not come right out and scream and
yell and say we mean to make the states amenable to suit, and we
mean to overrule their Eleventh Amendment immunity.'3 6 That
indeed may be how the age discrimination case comes out.
Nevertheless, there was no doubt about it in the patent and
trademark case.
Now you have a Boerne problem, which is that you cannot
expand on the definition of any right and there must be a
proportional remedy. 37 Remember the structure of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1 provides that every citizen is a citizen of
the state in which he or she resides, as well as a citizen of the
United States.'38 In addition, no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process, nor violate the
privileges and immunities of any citizen, nor deny any person
equal protection of the law.'3 9 Section 5, specifies that Congress
shall enforce this provision by appropriate legislation."'
Section 5 had been given the broadest interpretation by the
Supreme Court in a whole series of cases during the 1960's and
134Kimel

v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000)

135 Id. at 640.
136 Id.

137City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court cut back on
Congress' Section 5 powers by making those powers remedial and preventive.

That is, Congress cannot create a new Constitutionally protected right, but may
remedy an existing Constitutional wrong or prevent one from occurring. The
Court also opined that when Congress does enact a law which is either remedial
or preventive it must follow a rule of proportionality or congruence; meaning
that the law must be somehow proportionately or congruently related to the

Constitutional violation Congress is attempting to remedy or prevent form
occurring. Id

138 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
139 id.
140 id.
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1970's. Section 5 is equivalent to the necessary and proper
clause. 4 ' The Supreme Court, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,"" gave
section 5 a very broad reading.'43 We all know about the
Necessary and Proper Clause and M'Culloch v. Maryland," in
which the Supreme Court permitted Congress to do whatever is
appropriate for them to do in exercising their powers." Thus, the
Supreme Court give Congress the broadest possibly powers in
Section 5.
The Fourteenth Amendment is anomalous because the only
power that is talked about is the power of the federal government
vis-a-vis the states. Therefore, the real question is, are you going
to read Section 5 that broadly when the effect of the law is to
restrict the power of the states? It's one thing to say that the
Necessary and Proper Clause should be read broadly, however, if
the states have this residuary sovereignty, then how broad are you
going to read Section 5 power? This was the issue that the
Supreme Court had to decide in the FloridaPrepaidcase."
The trademark case was easy.4 7 The decision, written by Justice
Scalia, addressed the question "how was Congress enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment when it passed the Trademark Remedy
Act?' The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No state shall
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of the law."' 49 Is trademark property? Are you depriving anybody
of property if you engage in unfair competition? Well, the
Supreme Court said that there is no property right.' 0 We do not
think you can justify it on the grounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
141 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, C1. 18. This clause expands Congress' powers under
Art. I § 8. While Congress has been granted expressed powers in the
Constitution this clause allows for Congress to enact laws which are "necessary

and proper" to the carrying out of the expressed powers. Id
142 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
'4 Id at 648-49.
'44
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
14 5 Id. at 330.
'4FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd, 119 S. Ct at 2204.
147 College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219.
148 d
149

at 2222.

U.S. CoNsT.

amend. XIV.

'50 College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
151 .Id.
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There had been an earlier doctrine in the 1960's, called the
Parden Doctrine, under which the Supreme Court unanimously
said that Congress may pass a law saying that if you engage in this
activity you can be sued in federal court.5 2 The Pardencase was a
railroad case, and the law provided that if you start a railroad and
take any of the proscribed actions, then you can be sued in federal
court. 3 In Parden, a state had started a railroad, and they were
sued in federal court. 4 The Supreme Court, nine to nothing, said
that taking such-actions -as proscribed by the law is implied waiver
of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.'55 Therefore, if
Congress tells you that to engage in this activity shall waive your
immunity, and you engage in this activity, well then you waive
your immunity.
However, the Supreme Court in FloridaPrepaidsaid "so what,"
5 6 fmding no implied
and they overruled Parden,
waiver. 7 The
whole PardenDoctrine mandating that if you engage in proscribed
activity you can be sued in federal court and you waive your
Eleventh Amendment immunity, goes right out the window.
Accordingly, College Savings Bank gets dismissed since that was
the only basis for holding the state in the trademark case.'58

152

Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184

(1964), reh'g denied (June 22, 1964) overruled by Welch v. Texas Dept. of
Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
' 3 Petitioners in Parden sued under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45

U.S.C. § § 51-60 (FELA). FELA made it clear that any state operating a
common carrier railway while engaging in interstate commerce "shall be liable
in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
carrier . . ." Id. at § 51. Congress set the appropriate jurisdiction for such a
cause
of action in the district courts. Id. at § 56.
54
Parden,377 U.S. at 1208-09.
The Parden decision was a 5-4 decision with Justices White, Douglas,
Harlan and Stewart dissenting, however, all nine Justices agreed it is consistent
1

155

with Congress' power to base a State's participation in the interstate
transportation business "on a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity from
suits arising out of such business." Id.at 198 (J. White, dissenting).
156

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank,

119 S.Ct. 2199, 2204-05 (1999).
157 id.

151d. at 2211.
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Incidentally, the vote was five to four.' 9 You know who the five
are, and you know who the four are. So the key is can our side get
Kennedy or O'Connor? That is the question in every case, because
you know you are not going to get Scalia, Thomas or Rehnquist.
Therefore, you have to get Kennedy or O'Connor if you want to
win one of these cases. Every time a federalism argument is made
you must look at Kennedy and O'Connor. Ask yourself what did
they say in previous cases; what questions did they ask; are they
leaning in our direction; is there something in their earlier
decisions that we can rely on to get them on our side?
The more interesting case is the patent case, because a patent is
property. That is the FloridaPrepaidcase while College Savings
Bank is the trademark case.'6 In the patent case, they all agreed
that it was property, and a patent is property.' 6' The state's
argument was that we have not deprived any person of property
without due process of law.'" The Fourteenth Amendment does
not say, "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property", it says, "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process. ' 63
The state said we have a condemnation action, therefore you can
come into state court." If your patent is infringed, go to the Court,
of Claims in New York and bring an eminent domain action.
Unfortunately, there are a few problems with that. You can't get
an injunction, which is very important in a patent case. More
importantly, there is no longer uniformity because you are going to
have fifty states deciding what a patent is. The whole point of
establishing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is to have
some sort of uniformity in patent cases.' 65 Uniformity goes out the
window.

'59 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas voted in the
majority while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.
160

FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. at

2204.
161 Id
'

62

1d, at 2203.

163 U.S. CONST.

164

amend. XIV.

FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. at

2213.
165 id
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The most important part of the whole decision was the restriction
on Congress' power under Section 5. Justice Rehnquist said, and
here is the magic phrase, in enacting the Patent Remedy Act
Congress identified "no pattern" of patent infringement." Unlike
the established record of pervasive racial discrimination
confronting Congress in the voting rights issile, Congress came up
with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the state.'67
Therefore, when enforcing Section 5 it is not enough to say there is
.a problem. There must be a pattern, a big problem, before
Congress can exercise its power under Section 5.
You can never say that about the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Supreme Court cannot tell Congress that it cannot pass a law
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause unless there is a big
problem. It cannot be a little problem, it has to be a big problem; it
has to be a pattern. Nevertheless, in passing laws that take away
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, you must have a
pattern. That one is a rather serious block to the way in which
Congress exercises power under Section 5.
CONCLUSION
So this year, there are four more federal laws under challenge
this year on federalism grounds. However, I am not going to
predict their outcome, as I do not want to eat my words next year.
So, thank you very much.

'6ld.
at 2207.
' 67 . at 2205.
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THE NEW FEDERALISM
A Report of the Committee on Federal Legislatibn
Association of the Bar of the City of New York

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1994-95 Supreme Court Term, the Court has held twenty
separate federal laws unconstitutional. This rate is unprecedented in
our history. The Supreme Court has nullified a total of 150 acts of
Congress on constitutional grounds since Marbury v. Madison, I
Cranch 137 (1803), an average of slightly less than one act per year.
The recent trend of striking down an average of four statutes each
year is exceptional and deserves the attention of the legal profession
and other branches of government.
In annulling these federal laws, the Court has applied new
standards for examining legislation passed by Congress. While it is
not unusual for the Court to hold that a particular law violates the
First Amendment or the equal protection or separation of powers
doctrines, it was previously quite rare for the Court to hold that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause, as the
Court did in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Indeed,
before Lopez, the Court had not struck down a federal law on that
basis since 1936. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
In the Term after Lopez, 1995-96, the Court held in Seminole
Tribe of Floridav. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) that the Commerce
Clause did not give Congress the power to override the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congress, the Court said, could
only overcome the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States by
exercising its power under the Fourteenth Amendment and only by
expressing an unequivocal intent to do so.
More recently, the Court greatly expanded the Tenth Amendment
in Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997). In Printz, the
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Court struck down provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officials to
perform background checks on handgun purchasers for an interim
period before a federal computer system could be established. The
Court held that the federal government may not enlist state officials
to carry out federal policies. Printz calls into question many federal
laws that impose minimum burdens on state officials to supply
information to, or cooperate with, the federal government.
AfterQtrintz, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Court held that Congress could not, by exercising its powers under
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, expand individual rights beyond
the limits established by the Supreme Court in interpreting that
Amendment. That decision goes against a long line of decisions by
the Court that had interpreted Section 5 as the equivalent of the
"necessary and proper clause" in Article 1, Section 8. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966):
By including Section 5, the draftsman sought to grant to
Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
In its most recent Term, 1998-99, the Court expanded the
federalist rulings noted above still further. In Alden v. Maine, 119
S.Ct. 2240 (1999), the Court held that those provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act that expanded the protection of that law to state
employees, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), and that required the States to pay
overtime to their employees, could not be enforced in either state or
federal court. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999),
the Court struck down the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15
U.S.C. §1122, which extended the protections of the federal
Lanham Act to the States, holding that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited any such suit in federal court. And in the companion case
of Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999) the Court came to a
similar conclusion which respect to the Patent Remedy Act, 35
U.S.C. §271(h) and 296(a), which made the States amenable to suits
for patent infringement in federal court.
These decisions have created considerable concern that the Court
has imposed impractical and inappropriate limitations on the power
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of Congress to legislate in the national interest. The theme of all of
the decisions is a new view of federalism in which the power of the
federal government vis-a-vis the States is'constitutionally limited to a
degree unprecedented in modern times. The Court explained the
principle in PFrintz:
It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of
"dual sovereignty." ... Although the States surrendered
many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The
Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison). This is reflected
throughout the Constitution's text,...... Residual state
sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's
conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but
only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication
was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's assertion
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
117 S.Ct. at 2376-77.
The lower federal courts have recognized this trend, and some
have stretched and expanded the concept of states' rights to an
unprecedented degree. The discussion in some recent cases is
reminiscent of the early debates between the Federalists and AntiFederalists over ratification of the Constitution. The Fourth Circuit
began its recent opinion invalidating the Violence against Women
Act - a law protecting women from violence, sponsored in part by
Senators Hatch and Dole and passed by large majorities in both
Houses of Congress in 1994 - with the following exhortation:
We the People, distrustful of power, and believing that
government limited and dispersed protects freedom best,
provided that our federal government would be one of
enumerated powers, and that all power unenumerated would
be reserved to the several States and to ourselves. Thus,
though the authority conferred upon the federal government be
broad, it is an authority constrained by no less a power than
that of the People themselves. "[Tihat these limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). These
simple truths of power bestowed and power withheld under
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the Constitution have never been more relevant than in this
day, when accretion, if not actual accession, of power to the
federal government seems not only unavoidable, but even
expedient.
Brzonkala v. Virginia, 169 F.3d 820, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1999)(en
bane).
Simlarly, lower federal courts have applied the new federalism to
strike down numerous federal statutes, whose validity had never
been questioned before. Besides the Violence Against Women Act,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Drivers Privacy Protection Act were held
invalid as applied to the States. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in
Florida Prepaid, identified a number of other laws that were
vulnerable, based on the reasoning in that case -- including the
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. See 119 S.Ct.at 2219 fn 18. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
The Committee on Federal Legislation is greatly concerned that the
New Federalism developed by the Supreme Court and expanded by
the lower federal courts is both inappropriate and dangerous.
First, the formalistic rules established by the Supreme Court are
anti-majoritarian in the extreme. The decisions discussed in detail
below make it more difficult for the national Congress -- surely
expressing the desires and wishes of "We the People" -- to address
problems of national dimension on a national basis. The New
Federalism decisions focus primarily on those provisions of the
Constitution intended to preserve the theoretical separation of the
States in the constitutional scheme and protect them from
encroachment by the central federal government. These concerns
had some force at the founding of the republic, when a strong
central government was viewed as a danger to liberty. We believe
that the Court's resurrection of these doctrines at the threshhold of
the 21 st Century is anachronistic at best.
Second, the States do not need the assistance of the United States
Supreme Court to protect their independence. The Court's fear that
the States' separateness will be overwhelmed or undermined by
federal legislation and that they will become mere provinces in the
European model subject to direct central control is unrealistic in the
extreme. The Constitution affords the states ample power to protect
their separateness in a number of ways: the Senate consists of two

2000

FEDERALISM

269

senators from each state regardless of population. The Electoral
College guarantees that any candidate for President must deal with
the political power of each State separately. The States establish
both the qualifications of voters and the electoral lines of legislative
districts for the House of Representatives. We disagree with the
view that the States need further protection from the United States
Supreme Court, applying the vague phrases of the Tenth
Amendment or some general idea of proper "structure" between the
states and the federal government.
We believe that it is very undesirable to impose dramatic new
restrictions on Congress' power to legislate in the national interest.
The New Federalism adds to the already difficult process of
marshalling political and legislative support for initiatives that must
occur on a national level. We reject the notion that Congress, which
represents the concerns of the entire nation, cannot ask for State
cooperation on national policies, such as protecting the environment,
and cannot make the States amenable to protective or antidiscriminatory legislation in dealing with its own employees. We are
not dealing with theoretical problems of an Eighteenth Century rural
society where the greatest danger to freedom seemed to be a national
government with a standing army. We should not interpret the
Constitution as if that were the chief threat facing our government
today.
This report will examine each of the relevant recent Supreme
Court decisions and suggest ways in which Congress, in passing
future legislation, may satisfy the Supreme Court's concerns about
federalism. We believe that Congress should make its purpose clear
in passing protective federal legislation affecting state employees or
requesting state aid in carrying out federal policies. In addition, in
exercising its power of the purse, it may condition the grant of
federal funds to the States upon their compliance with federal
policies designed to resolve national problems on a national basis.
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II. COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS AFTER LOPEZ
Lopez appeared, initially, to impose the most severe restrictions on
Congress. In practice, however, the lower federal courts have
generallycnot 6xpanded the -uling, which. appears to present serious
challenges to few federal laws, with one notable exception from the
Fourth Circuit. Congress itself easily corrected the defect the Court
identified in Lopez. The Court gave Congress considerable leeway in
relying on the Commerce Clause, and the case no longer seems a
serious barrier to legislation.
A. The holding in Lopez.
The Supreme Court in Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which forbids "any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows ... is a school zone," 18

U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). The Court held in a five-to-four decision
that the law was explicitly based upon Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause. The Court returned to what it called "first
principles" of our Constitutional scheme, under which the police
power of the States was virtually unlimited (unless specifically
prohibited by some Constitutional limitation) while the powers of the
federal government "are few and defined."
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8.
As James Madison wrote, "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp.
292?293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
This constitutionally
mandated division of authority "was adopted by the Framers
to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."
Although the Court acknowledged that its modem precedents had
significantly expanded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
to permit it to deal with national problems, there remained
limitations on that power:
But even these modem-era precedents which have expanded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that
this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin
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Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate
commerce power "must be considered in the light of our dual
system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government." 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624.
514 U.S. at 556-57.
To support a Congressional enactment under the clause, one of
three conditions had to be met. The Court explained:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities.... Finally, Congress'
commerce
authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.... i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
514 U.S. at 558-59.
Congress has broad power to regulate the "channels of interstate
commerce," (e.g., railroads, wire communications, the mail) and to
"protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce," e.g., guns or drugs that have moved
in interstate commerce. But with respect to the last category, where
an interstate facility is not involved and no "person or thing" has
moved in interstate commerce, three requirements must be met: (1)
the activity that is regulated must involve or affect commerce in the
strictest sense, that is, "economic enterprise" or activity; (2) the
activity regulated by the federal law must "substantially affect"
interstate commerce; (3) the Court will not simply accept Congress'
say-so that the required effect exists.
We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate omerce.... But to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate
the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no
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such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here.
514 U.S. at 562-63.
The Court rejected the government's argument that crime has an
affect on interstate commerce and that .guns in school zones will
ultimately impact on the nation's economic activities, noting:
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, eIn' -in -areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign.
Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.
514 U.S. at 564.
The Court thereby redefined federalism, finding the general power
to legislate for the public good should remain in the hands of the
States, and that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress
to legislate in every area of national life.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long
steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional
action ....

The

broad

language

in

these

opinions

has

suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we
decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers
does not presuppose something not enumerated,...

and that

there never will be a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.... This we are unwilling to do.

514 U.S. at 567-68.
B. Lower Court interpretation of Lopez.
The decision in Lopez precipitated challenges against dozens of
federal laws. The constitutionality of the Violence against Women
Act (VAWA) (42 U.S.C. § 13981 et seq.) under Lopez has been
debated in many cases, see, e.g., United States v. Page, 136 F.3d
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481 (6th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49 (2d
Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit, however, is the only circuit to apply
the reasoning of Lopez to invalidate the' VAWA. See Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)(en
banc)(holding that criminal violence based on gender did not involve
commercial activity and that ultimate impact of violence against
women on the movement of goods and services across state lines did
not create sufficient interstate nexus under Lopez). The validity of
the Child Support Recovery Act (18 U.S.C. §228) was upheld in
United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997) and United
States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
Federal courts have also had to deal with Lopez challenges to the
Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. §1951), see United States v. Guerra, 164
F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999); the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act
(FACE), see Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997) and
United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 1998); the federal
drug trafficking statute (21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1)), see United States v.
Patterson, 140 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1998); the federal child
pornography statute (18 U.S.C. §2252), see United States v.
Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998) and United States v.
Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998); the federal arson statute
(18 U.S.C. §844(i)), see United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d
Cir. 1998); the firearm possession law, (18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)), see
United States v. Crawford, 130 F.3d 1321 (8th Cir. 1997); the
domestic violence gun possession law, (18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8)), see
United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1998);
contraband cigarette trafficking law, (18 U.S.C. §2341-46), see
United States v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897 (6th Cir. 1998); the federal
car-jacking law (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and sentencing factors under the
law, see United States v. Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1 (lst Cir.
1998); United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998) and
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995), appeal after
remand, 116 F.3d 1487 (9th Cir. 1997).
The lower courts have had no difficulty in concluding that even
without a specifically articulated interstate nexus, laws against
arson, the possession of a machine gun, devices of mass destruction
or possession of explosives has a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. See generally United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320 (6th
Cir. 1997)(arson statute), United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90
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(2d Cir. 1998)(machine gun possession), United States v. Viscome,
144 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998)(possession of weapons of mass
destruction), and United States v. Dascenzo, 152 F.3d 1300 (11th
Cir. 1998)(possession of explosives).
Rarely has a lower federal court upheld a challenge under Lopez to
a federal law. H4bwever, the Fourth Circuit held that regulations
issued under the Clean Water Act, which extended federal legal
protection to certain wetlands, exceeded Congressional power under
the Commerce Flause,. see -United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251
(4th Cir. 1997). It has also recently held that the VAWA was
unconstitutional since there was no showing that violence against
women had a substantial effect on commercial activity between the
states. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820
(4th Cir. 1999)(en banc). Prompt review of that decision in the
Supreme Court is being sought by the government.
In addition, one district court has held that the Child Support
Recovery Act (18 U.S.C. §228), criminalizing a parent's failure to
make child support payments when the parent and child live in
different states, was unconstitutional, see United States v.
Schroeder, 894 F.Supp 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), but that decision was
reversed on appeal, United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.
1996).
The overwhelming number of cases treat the limitations established
by Lopez as a minor problem, easily correctable through the devices
mentioned below. So long as Congress relies upon regulating the
"channels" of interstate commerce or "persons or things" moving
in interstate commerce as the basis for legislation, Lopez should not
pose an impediment.
C. Congressional Response After Lopez.
Shortly after the decision in Lopez, Congress amended the Gun
Free School Zones Act to correct the defect noted by the Supreme
Court. In P.L. 104-294, Congress added the underlined twelve
words to the law to create the missing interstate nexus: "It shall be
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has
moved in or that otherwise affects interstate orforeign commerce at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A). Since the new law
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specifically relies for federal jurisdiction upon a "thing" (the gun)
that moved in interstate commerce, the deficiency noted in Lopez
was corrected.
Thus, so long as Congress relies on the first two bases for its
commerce clause legislation - regulating a "channel" of interstate
commerce or regulating or protecting a "person or thing" that
moved in interstate commerce, Lopez is not a problem.
Even if there is no explicit interstate nexus, Congress can make
specific legislative fact-findings to demonstrate the "substantial
effect" on economic activity required for the third prong of Lopez.
In the future, the case should not create a serious bar to the exercise
of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
LII.

STATE IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL SUIT UNDER THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.

The most serious obstacle to the exercise of Congressional power
is Seminole Tribe. The Supreme Court expanded the rationale of that
decision in three cases decided in the 1998-99 Term, mentioned
above, Alden, Florida Prepaid, and College Savings Bank. Lower
federal courts found that Congress lacked the power after Seminole,
Tribe to expand federal court jurisdiction over the States in many
separate instances, involving such important federal laws as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. As noted above, in his dissent in FloridaPrepaid,
Justice Stevens identified six separate federal laws that were also
susceptible based on Seminole Tribe.
A. Seminole Tribe, Alden and FloridaPrepaid.
The Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe that Congress could not
rely upon its commerce clause power to overcome a State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity, even if Congress made its intent and purpose
unequivocally clear. In a five-to-four decision (involving the same
majority as in Lopez), the Court struck down a provision of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that permitted a federal court
action against a state to compel state officials to negotiate with an
Indian tribe with respect to a gambling compact. The IGRA allows
an Indian tribe to conduct certain gaming activities only in
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conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in
which the gaming activities are located. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
Under the Act, States have a duty to negotiate in good faith with a
tribe toward the formation of a compact, § 2710(d)(3)(A), and a
tribe may sue a State in federal court in order to compel
performance of that duty, § 2710(d)(7). 'Florida refused to negotiate
with the Seminole Tribe, and suit was then brought by the Seminoles
in federal court to compel the State to engage in the required
negotiations.
Striking down that provision of the IGRA that permitted a federal
court action to compel the state to negotiate, the Court noted that
there were two requirements for Congress to abrogate a State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity: First, Congress must unequivocally
express its intent to do so and second, it must act "pursuant to a
valid exercise of power." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985).
In this instance, through the numerous references to the "State" in
§ 2710(d)(7)(B)'s text, Congress provided an "unmistakably clear"
statement of its intent to abrogate.
With respect to the second condition, the Court had to decide
whether the law was passed pursuant to a constitutional provision
granting Congress such power. The Court had previously held that
Congress could rely upon its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to overrule a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In a later
split decision, the Court held that Congress could also rely upon the
Commerce Clause to overrule a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). The
Union Gas plurality found "that Congress' power to abrogate came
from the States' cession of their sovereignty when they gave
Congress plenary power to regulate commerce, and thus the States
had "consented" to the waiver of their 11 th Amendment immunity.
Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas and held that Congress could
not rely upon the Commerce Clause to make States amenable to
federal court jurisdiction.
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the
background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate
when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of
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Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the
Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete law-making authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power
under Article HI, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must be dismissed
for a lack of jurisdiction.
517 U.S. at 72-73.
The Supreme Court read even more federalism dictates into the
Eleventh Amendment in Alden v. Maine. That case was originally
brought by certain probation officers from the State of Maine, who
sued for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. After the
Seminole Tribe decision, the First Circuit dismissed the case,
holding that since the FLSA was passed pursuant to Congress'
Commerce Clause power, the State could now raise an Eleventh
Amendment defense. See Mills v. State of Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (lst
Cir. 1997).
The plaintiff in Mills then moved his case for overtime pay to state
court, relying on a long line of Supreme Court cases holding that the
Eleventh Amendment was not a defense to a suit against a State
brought in state court: " ...

the Eleventh Amendment does not

apply in state courts," Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U. S. 58, 63?64 (1989). Nevetheless, the Maine Supreme Court
held that Congress could not require the states to entertain federal
causes of action that could not be brought in federal court because of
the Eleventh Amendment, see Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me.
1998), affirmed, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999).
The Supreme Court, in yet another five-to-four decision written by
Justice Kennedy, held that even though the Eleventh Amendment by
its own terms prohibited suits against the States in federal court, the
Amendment embodies a broader sovereign immunity doctrine which
protects the States from federal suits in their own courts.
We have ... sometimes referred to the States' immunity from

suit as "Eleventh Amendment immunity." The phrase is
convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is
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limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as
the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the
States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of
the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally
or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal
footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of
- the Convention -or certain constitutional Amendments.
119 S.Ct. at 2246.
Examining the history of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
immunity cases, Justice Kennedy noted:
These holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding,
consistent with the views of the leading advocates of the
Constitution's ratification, that sovereign immunity derives not
from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the
original Constitution itself.
Id. at 2254.
The Court examined in great detail the historical background to
State sovereign immunity, Congressional practice and court
decisions interpreting the concept. Based on this broader
interpretation of the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
held that Congress lacked the power to abrogate State sovereign
immunity in its own courts.

In some ways, of course, a congressional power to authorize
private suits against non consenting States in their own courts
would be even more offensive to state sovereignty than a
power to authorize the suits in a federal forum ..... A power
to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the
other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to
turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will and at
the behest of individuals.

.

. Such plenary federal control of

state governmental processes denigrates the separate
sovereignty of the States.
The Court concluded:
In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the
Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from
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private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.
In the two other five-to-four Eleventh Amendment decisions
decided in the 1998-99 Term, College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. 2219
(1999) and FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducationExpense Board
v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999), the Court struck
down the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. §1122,
and the Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §271(h) and 296(a), which
made the States amenable to suit for trademark and patent
infringement in federal court.
In the trademark case, the Court held that the State of Florida had
not impliedly or constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by engaging in commercial activity that fell within the
Trademark Remedy Act. The Court overruled the Parden doctrine
(Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184
(1964)), under which a State may constructively waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by engaging in activity that Congress warned
could lead to a federal suit. Pardenhad held:
By enacting the [FELA] ... Congress conditioned the right to
operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to
suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter
operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be
taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have
consented to suit.
377 U. S., at 192.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court rejected the principle of
"constructive waiver":
We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden
was ill-conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage
any remnant of it. As we explain below in detail, Parden
broke sharply with prior cases, and is fundamentally
incompatible with later ones. We have never applied the
holding of Parden to another statute, and in fact have
narrowed the case in every subsequent opinion in which it has
been under consideration. In short, Parden stands as an
anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and
indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law. Today, we
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drop the other shoe: Whatever may remain of our decision in
Parden is expressly overruled.
In the companion patent case, the Court examined the question
whether Congress had properly exercised its power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the Patent Remedy Act.
That is, was Congress enforcing the due process clause by making
the States amenable to suit in federal court for patent infringement?
The Court concluded that a patent right was a property right. But it
held -that Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment by passing the law in question, since it was not clearly
established that patent infringement by the States was a pervasive
problem that had to be solved by Congressional exercise of its
Section 5 power. Relying on the narrowing interpretation of
Congressional power under section 5 as described in City of Boerne,
the Court held that Congress had to demonstrate that the law it
passed could be viewed as remedial or preventive legislation aimed
at securing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for victims
of State actions.
The Court explained:
In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.
Unlike the
undisputed record of racial discrimination confronting
Congress in the voting rights cases, see City of Boerne, supra,
at 525-27, Congress came up with little evidence of infringing
conduct on the part of the States. The House Report
acknowledged that "many states comply with patent law" and
could provide only two examples of patent infringement suits
against the States. See H. R. Rep., at 38. The Federal
Circuit in its opinion identified only eight patent infringement
suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years between
1880 and 1990.
Even if a deprivation of property rights had occurred, the States
did provide a remedy through their own courts.
Thus, under the plain terms of the Clause and the clear import
of our precedent, a State's infringement of a patent, though
interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude others, does
not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only where the
State provides no remedy, or only i mC- luate remedies, to
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injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could
a deprivation of property without due process result.
Since a remedy (such as an eminent domain suit in state court) was
possible, no deprivation could be shown.
B. Lower Court Expansion of Eleventh Amendment.
After 1989, Congress reacted to the Union Gas decision by passing
a series of laws making the States amenable to federal court
jurisdiction. As noted above, Congress amended the Copyright,
Patent and Trademark Laws, specifically granting jurisdiction to
federal courts to hear cases against the States involving infringement
of rights in those areas. See e.g., 17 U.S.C. §511, 35 U.S.C.
§271(h) and §296(a), and 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) and (2). In
addition, Congress had expanded federal anti-discrimination laws,
particularly in the employment area, and made the States proper
defendants in such suits, in view of the States' significant role as a
major employer.'
Soon after Seminole Tribe, the lower federal courts began to
examine the question of whether the States may be sued in federal
court for violating various anti-discrimination laws passed by,
Congress. As noted above, the Court had held in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) that Congress had properly exercised its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in making the
states amendable to suit under Title VII for discrimination based on
race, gender or national origin.
Lower federal courts applied the same reasoning to uphold the
Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. §206) see Varner v. Illinois State
University, 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998). For the most part,
federal courts have upheld the validity of almost all of the important
anti-discrimination laws such as Title VI, the ADEA and the ADA
as applied to the States. See Cooper v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998)(ADEA); Magneault v.
Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998)(ADEA); Coger v. Board of
Regents of State of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998)(ADEA);
According to Justice Souter's dissent in Alden, the States collectively
employed 4,732,608 workers in 1997, see fa. 40, approximately 3.5% of the
total civilian work force in the United States.
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Debs v. Northeastern Illinois University, 153 F.3d 390 (7th Cir.
1998)(ADEA); and Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois, 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997)(upholding validity of
ADEA as applied to the States); Autio v. AFSCME, 140 F.3d 802
(8th Cir. 1998)(ADA as applied to states was valid exercise of
Congressional power under Section of 14th Amendment); Alsbrook
v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1998)(ADA); Lesage v.
State of Texas, 158 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1998)(Congress had authority
.to abr.gate States'.Eleventh-l1th Amendment -immunity under Title
VI); Anderson v. State University of New York, 169 F.3d 117 (2d
Cir. 1999)(Congress had authority to overrule state's
lth
Amendment immunity in Equal Pay Act); Varner v. Illinois State
University, 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998)(Equal Pay Act).
But some lower federal courts have come to opposite conclusions.
Thus the Eighth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have held that the
ADEA was not properly passed pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and States may assert their Eleventh
Amendment immunity to private suits brought against the states to
enforce that law. See Humenansky v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota, 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998) and Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11 th Cir. 1997) cert. granted,
119 S.Ct.
(January 25, 1999). The Americans with Disabilities
Act was recently declared invalid insofar as it authorized suits
against the states, see Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999)(holding that ADA
regulations prohibiting states from charging handicapped people for
special parking places were unconstitutional) and Kilcullen v. New
York State Department of Transportation, 33 F.Supp.2d 133 (N.D.
N.Y. 1999)(ADA requirefiient of "reasonable accommodation"
placed upon States and permitting suits against States, invalid under
Eleventh Amendment).
The 1998-99 cases read even more force into the Eleventh
Amendment, thus encouraging the States to raise even more
objections to federal law.
C. Legislative Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
As noted, Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity if it makes its intenti n to do so clear, and if
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it acts pursuant to a valid exercise of Constitutional power, such as
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, for example, to the
extent that Congress' intention to overrule a State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity was held to be unclear under the ADEA or
the ADA, Congress could rectify the problem by doing what it tried
to do in the Patent Remedy Act - specifically naming the States as
proper defendants under these Acts.
The Eighth Circuit held in Humenansky that Congress did not
make its intent to overrule a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
"unmistakably clear," as required by Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 232 (1989). Although the 1974 amendments to the ADEA
specifically broadened the definition of an "employer" to include a
"State or a political subdivision of a State," see 29 U.S.C. §630(b),
the Eighth Circuit found that Congress' failure to specifically
mention its intent to overrule a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity or to amend the jurisdictional section of the law
(specifically allowing suits in federal court) did not satisfy the strict
requirements of Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, n. 6. See 152 F.3d
at 825.
In the Eleventh Circuit decision in Kimel, also invalidating the
ADEA's application to the States, one judge (Edmondson) came to
the same conclusion. (A concurring Judge found that age was not a
protected status under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus the law was invalid on that ground since
Congress could enforce the equal protection provisions of Section 1
only with respect to classes found subject to heightened scrutiny.
This was also an alternative holding of the Eighth Circuit in
Humenansky.)
The solution is for Congress to specifically express its intention not
only to make States amenable to suit, but also to express its desire to
overrule the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. For example,
42 U.S.C. §2000d-7 (a)(1) reads as follows: "A State shall not be
immune
under
the
Eleventh
Amendment
of
the
Constitution... from suit in Federal court for a violation of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

.

.

.title IX of the Education

Amendments .... Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by
recipients of Federal financial assistance." This type of provision
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would certainly seem to satisfy the "unmistakably clear"
requirement mentioned above.
In addition, if Congress is relying upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the basis for overruling a States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, it should say so. The Fifth Circuit panel
decision in Chavez holding that the Copyright Remedy Act was
unconstitutional relied in part on the fact that Congress did not
explicitly cite Section 5 of the 14th Amendment when it passed that
law: "The Cop3yight --Remedy Clarification Act -does not expressly
rely on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ... It may be too

much of a leap to infer Congress' reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment in the copyright amendments when it did not expressly
state its intent to legislate on that basis." 157 F.3d at 288, n. 8.
Once again, the solution is to cite specifically Section 5 if
Congress wishes to make the States amenable to suit in federal
court. As noted below, City of Boerne also places an additional
burden on Congress to show that its reliance on Section 5 was
remedial and proportionate. In addition, Congress is now required to
make findings that the State action it is remedying involved a
"pattern" of unconstitutional action. See Florida Prepaid: "In
enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no
pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations .... Congress came up with little evidence

of infringing conduct on the part of the States."
Another possible solution, as previously suggested by the Civil
Rights Committee of this Association, was for Congress to condition
federal financial assistance upon a State's waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Under the Supreme Court decision in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)(a seven-to-two decision
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which Justice Scalia joined),
Congress may impose conditions on the States pursuant to its
exercise of its Spending Power. Thus Congress could require the
States to surrender their immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
in order to obtain highway funds, crime control expenditures,
medicaid or medicare funds, education funds or even funds under
the Social Security Act. If the States wish to obtain federal funds
under various social welfare provisions, they must accede to the
anti-discrimination laws mentioned above, such as the ADEA and
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ADA, and waive their immunity for suit in federal court.
discussion below at pp. 25-26.
IV.

285
See

THE PRJNTZ DECISION AND TENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY

In yet another five-to-four decision involving the same voting
majority as in Lopez and Seminole Tribe, the Court in Printz held
that the federal government may not enlist state officials to carry out
federal policies. Thus as minor a burden as requiring local sheriffs
to conduct background checks on potential purchasers of handguns
(until a national computer system could be established) violated
2
States' rights under the Tenth Amendment.
A. The Printz Decision
The 1993 amendments to the federal Gun Control Act (the Brady
Bill) required the "chief law enforcement officer" in local
jurisdictions to make background checks on potential purchaser of
handguns, to insure that they did not fall within certain prohibited
categories, such as convicted felons, aliens, dishonorably discharged
veterans or persons adjudicated as mentally defective or committed
to mental institutions. The Act required the Attorney General to
establish a national instant background check system by November
30, 1998, at which time the state officers' obligation to perform
background checks would end.
The interim background check requirement was challenged by
various sheriffs, who claimed that the Tenth Amendment forbade
Congress from enlisting them to carry out the federal policy. The
Supreme Court agreed.
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia examined various early
federal laws which generally placed certain reporting requirements
on state officials to supply information to the federal government
and distinguished them from the requirements of the Brady Bill.

2 The

Association had filed a brief as Amicus curiae in Prinrz urging that the
background check provision be upheld. See "The Brady Bill and the Tenth
Amendment," 52 The Record (March, 1997).

286

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

He then examined the "structure" of the Constitution, which
unequivocally showed that:
using the States as the instruments of federal governance was
both ineffectual and provocative of federal/state conflict. See
.The Federalist No. 15.
Preservation of the States as
independent political entities being the price of union, and
"[t]he practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions,
for the States as political bodies" having been, in Madison's
words, "exploded on all hands," 2 Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, p. 9 (M. Farrand ed. 1911), the Framers
rejected the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in
which the state and federal governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people ?? who were, in
Hamilton's words, "the only proper objects of government,"
The Federalist No. 15, at 109.
117 S.Ct. at 2376.
According to Justice Scalia's analysis, "The Constitution thus
contemplates that a State's government will represent and remain
accountable to its own citizens." Id. This structure, the Court
reasoned, was crucial to protect the people's freedom:
This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's
structural protections of liberty. "Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front."
Id. citing Gregory, 111 S.Ct.; at 2400.
Finally, the Court found that the requirements of the Brady Bill
violated the "political accountability" requirements of New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992):
The Government also maintains that requiring state officers to
perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does
not violate the principle of New York because it does not
diminish the accountability of state or federal officials. This
argument fails even on its own terms. By forcing state
governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take
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credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.
117 S.Ct. at 2382.
B. Application of the Printz Decision
Other courts have applied Pfrintz to cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act as it applies to state
and local government employees. See West v. Anne Arundel County
Maryland, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Circuit held that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(18 U.S.C. §2721-2725), which broadly prohibited States from
selling motor vehicle records for commercial purposes, was
unconstitutional under Printz, see Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. since Congress was
requiring state officials to carry out a federal policy.
The First Circuit had to deal with the question of whether, after
Printz, an injunction would be issued under the Endangered Species
Act against state officials issuing permits for lobster pot fishing. See
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997). Although the Court
ultimately upheld the injunction against state officials issuing gillnet
permits and lobster pot fishing permits, the Court acknowledged that
Printz had raised serious barriers to federal environmental
requirements against state officials. The Ninth Circuit found the
Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act (16 U.S.C.
§ 620-620j) invalid, Board of National Resources v. Brown, 993
F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir 1993), because of the burden placed on state
officials to carry out a federal environmental policy.
Many other requirements of the federal environmental laws, which
require state coordination and reporting, may be questionable after
Printz. Among the questionable laws are the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 2645, 2647,
requiring governors to develop management plans for dealing with
asbestos in school buildings, and the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §11001,
requiring states to create emergency response commissions. See
generally Jonathan Adler, "The Green Aspects of Printz: The
Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law,"
6 Geo. MASON L. REV. 573 (1998).See also Vicki C. Jackson,
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"Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law," 111 HARV. L. REv.
2181, 2205 (1998).
C. Legislative Solution to Printz
The Printz- restriction on Congressional power under the Tenth
Amendment cannot be evaded simply by Congressional expression
of its intent to overturn a State's immunity. Printz and New York
both provide that a State cannot involuntarily be required to carry
out any federal policy.
However, in the same way that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment can be utilized to overrule States' immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, we think it can also be relied upon to serve as
a basis for federal action to prevail against a Tenth Amendment
challenge. See Evan H. Caminker, "Printz, State Sovereignty, and
the Limits of Federalism," 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199, 238 (1997).
Thus so long a Congress has made the proper legislative findings
and has expressed its clear intent to rely on Section 5, the analysis is
the same as with the Eleventh Amendment above.
For example, the States can be obliged to follow the requirements
of the Voting Rights Act and carry out federal policy to insure the
elimination of barriers to voting. Since the Voting Rights Law was
clearly based on the Fourteenth Amendment, Printz does not bar its
enforcement.
Another solution to the problems caused by the Court's reliance on
the Tenth Amendment doctrine may lie in the Spending Power. In
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that Congress may condition receipt of federal funds upon state
compliance with federal requirements if three conditions are met: (1)
the condition must relate "to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs," 483 U.S. at 210; (2) there is no
other constitutional prohibition that independently bars the
conditional grant of funds (such as the "unconstitutional condition"
doctrine), 483 U.S. at 207; (3) the financial inducement must not be
"coercive," 483 U.S. at 211.
States receive a wide variety of federal funds for highway
construction, crime control, medicaid, medicare, education, social
security and other programs. Congress could condition the States'
receipt of such funds upon the States' agreement to carry out certain
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federal policies in the areas for which funds are made available to
the States, such as the Brady gun control act (crime control funds)
or the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (highway funds), the subject
of cases described above. Surely if Congress could require the states
to raise the drinking age to 21 or lose millions of dollars in highway
funds, Congress could also require the States to protect the privacy
of motor vehicle records or lose such funds.
Congressional conditional grant of funds in these areas would
appear to meet the three conditions noted above.3
V.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Another important federalism decision was City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which struck down a very popular
Congressional enactment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In Morgan v. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) the Court had
held that Congress could, through specific legislation, enlarge the
scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights as previously defined by the
Supreme Court. Now the Supreme Court in City of Boerne has cast
doubt on that principle.
A. The Decision in City of Boerne.
In City of Boerne, the Court analyzed the extent of Congressional
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
examined Congress' power to alter the extent of protection of
religious rights through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In a
previous decision, the Court had held in Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) that any
law of general applicability that impacted on free exercise rights
would be measured under a more lenient standard than a
"compelling state interest" test.
Congress was dissatisfied with such a moderate and easily met test.
It quickly passed the RFRA, which required that whenever
3 This is the conclusion reached by most commentators on the issue. See
Jesse H. Choper, "On the Difference in Importance between Supreme Court
Doctrine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 19961997 Term," 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 2259, 2271 (1998).
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government action substantially burdens religious free exercise
rights, the government action can be upheld only by the
demonstration of a compelling state interest. And this test would
have to be applied to laws or actions that directly focused on
religious rights or to laws of general applicability that impacted
substantially m, such rights., It -was -that law, explicitly passed
pursuant to Congressional power under Section 5, which City of
Boerne examined.
In previous cases, the Court had held that Section 5 must be
interpreted as broadly as the Necessary and Proper clause.
By including Section 5, the draftsman sought to grant to
Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
The Court had noted that Congress may deem it necessary to add
specific statutory guarantees to the broad language of the rights
contained in Section 1 of the Amendment:
[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged [by §5].
Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by
appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to
make the amendments fully effective. Id. at 648.
To eliminate any lingering doubt over the true intent of Section 5,
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court and citing the legislative
history of the Amendment, reasoned in Morgan:
[e]arlier drafts of the proposed Amendment employed the
"necessary and proper" terminology to describe the scope of
congressional

power

under

the

Amendment ...The

substitution of the "appropriate legislation" formula was
never thought to have the effect of diminishing the scope of
this congressional power. Id., fn. 9.
But as broad as this power may be, Congress cannot create new
constitutional rights in the guise of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court explained in Boerne:
Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to
"enforc[ing]" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court has described this power as "remedial," South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 326, 86 S.Ct., at 817-18.
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
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inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power
to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to
enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.
117 S.Ct. 2164.
The Court concluded that any remedy that Congress establishes to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
must be "proportionate" to the evil sought to be corrected:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and
Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies,
the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law
support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of
the Amendment. Id.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court added another prerequisite to
exercise of Congress' power under Section 5. Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that:
Following City of Boerne, we must first identify the
Fourteenth Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress
intended to remedy, guided by the principle that the propriety
of any §5 legislation 'must be judged with reference to the
historical experience ... it reflects.'"

With respect to the

problem of state infringement of patents, the Court noted that:
"In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.
B. Effect of City of Boerne and FloridaPrepaid
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The key issue under City of Boerne is whether Congress is simply
providing a proportionate remedy to the violation of a Constitutional
right already recognized by the Supreme Court or whether Congress
is attempting to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States." In addition, there must be
a showing that Congress was attempting to deal with a "pattern" of
unconstitutional action by the States, as required by Florida
Prepaid.
The issuO has arisen in a scattering of cases in the lower federal
courts. The Fourth Circuit has rejected the purported exercise of
Congressional power under Section 5 in two recent cases, Brown v.
North CarolinaDivision of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
1999)(holding that federal regulations under the ADA prohibiting
states from charging for handicapped parking privileges were
unconstitutional and not a proper exercise of Congressional power
under Section 5) and Brozankala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute,
169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)(holding that the Violence against
Women Act was not validly enacted pursuant to Congress' Section 5
power).
In Brown, the Court found that the regulations under the ADA
which barred the requirement of payment for handicapped parking
was too much of an intrusion into the States' traditional power. The
Court noted:
Nor do the safeguards of federalism wither in the face of an
overzealous bureaucracy intent upon imposing its will on the
states. Regulations that unjustifiably intrude "into the States'
traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for
the health and welfare of their citizens," Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at
2171, are invalid exercises of power. Just as the Eleventh
Amendment does not leave states without a shield when they
confront congressional acts, states are not rendered
defenseless in their duels with government by bureaucracy.
166 F.3d at 704.
The Court noted:
Here, we hold that 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f), which prohibits a
state from charging even a modest fee to recover the costs of
its efforts to aid the handicapped, lies beyond the remedial
scope of the Section 5 power. As such, it is not a
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constitutionally valid exercise of power, and the effort to
abrogate must fail. Id. at 705.
Similarly, in the Brzonkala decision, the Court relied upon
generalized notions of federalism, noting "'the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and
welfare of their citizens.'" 169 F.3d at 851.
In both cases, the Fourth Circuit found that Congress' power to
legislate under Section 5 is disproportionate and a violation of the
Boerne restriction if it violates the States' traditional prerogatives
and general authority "to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens."
Most other Circuits have rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach.
Thus the Second Circuit recently upheld the validity of the Equal
Pay Act as a proper exercise of Congress' Section 5 power.
Finally, the EPA's provisions are not out of proportion to the
harms that Congress intended to remedy and deter... Since
the EPA provides an employer with four affirmative defenses,
including the ability to prove that the wage differential [is]
based on any other factor other than sex, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1)(iv), the EPA reaches only those wage disparities
for which the employee's sex provides the sole
explanation.... Thus, the statute is remedial legislation
reasonably tailored to remedy intentional gender-based wage
discrimination and is sufficiently limited in scope to satisfy the
City of Boerne test.
Anderson v. State University of New York, 169 F.3d 117, 121 (2d
Cir. 1999).
C. Congressional Response to City of Boerne.
Congress has limited options to meet the requirements of City of
Boerne. Once again, it can attempt to justify any remedial
legislation by making a careful legislative record of the problem
which the legislation is attempting to meet and why its legislation is
"proportionate" to the problem. While Congressional findings are
not conclusive on the federal courts, see Lopez, the normal
deference that federal courts afford to Congressional conclusions on
the need for legislation should go a long way to satisfying the rule.

294

TOUROLAWREVIEW

[Vol 16

VI. CONCLUSION
The States' concern about restrictions being placed on them by
Congressional legislation can better be determined in the political
arena, where the States have ample power to express and defend
their positions, rather than by federal court decision. The New
Federalism presents an unnecessary barrier to the already difficult
process of enacting legislation on a national scale.
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[1] According to Justice Souter's dissent in Alden, the States
collectively employed
4,732,608 workers in 1997, see fn. 40, approximately 3.5% of the
total civilian work force in
the United States.
[2] [Get citation of Civil Right Committee report]
[3] The Association had filed a brief as Amicus curiae in Printz
urging that the background
check provision be upheld. See "The Brady Bill and the Tenth
Amendment," 52 The Record
(March, 1997).
[4] This is the conclusion reached by most commentators on the
issue. See Jesse H. Choper,
"On the Difference in Importance between Supreme Court Doctrine
and Actual Consequences: A
Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term," 19 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2259, 2271 (1998).
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